"The Marines of '61" The U.S. Marine Battalion at the Battle of 1st Manassas

A moment in Marine Corps history that is often overlooked or misinterpreted is the involvement of the U.S. Marines at the Battle of First Bull Run (Manassas), VA, at the beginning of the American Civil War. Much has been written about the Generals and the grand strategies, but little has focused on those nameless souls in the ranks, whose courage and actions ultimately determine whether engagements are won or lost. A number of those souls, green recruits when they entered the killing fields at Manassas, would earn the title United States Marine. Considered by some to be one of the less then shining moments in our history, upon a closer examination, the accomplishments of those Marines were, under the circumstances, extraordinary. Although considered a Federal military defeat, the ethos, courage, discipline, and leadership demonstrated by those Marines at Manassas, can be compared with those at Bladensburg, MD during the War of 1812, and at Chosin, Korea a century later. Their conduct and actions would reflect the very foundation upon which our Corps is built. What follows is a brief thumbnail sketch of those actions.



The United States Marine Corps entered the American Civil War hobbled by the loss of many of its officers to the South. Fully one-third of the Corps leaders departed for the Confederacy, but primarily those in the company grades who would bear the brunt of the front line fighting. The rapid expansion of the U.S. Navy further drained officers, NCOs, and seasoned enlisted men for new ship's detachments. Congress authorized An increase in the Marine Corps' strength in early 1861, which would almost double their size. This would bring a substantial number of new recruits to the Corps, but by then there was hardly any veterans available to train them.

At the Marine Barracks, Washington in mid-July, one officer noted that the 377 junior enlisted men training there "are not fit to go into the field, for every man of them is as raw as you please, not more than a hundred of them have been here over three weeks." Many of the lieutenants were equally new to the service and themselves in training.

Nonetheless, in early July the Secretary of the Navy, acting on a request from the War Department, ordered the forming of a Marine Battalion for service with the Army in the first offensive against the Confederacy. In a blatant departure from established protocol Secretary of the Navy Welles sent orders to several Marine officers to report to Washington for duty with the Battalion without going through the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He further assigned

Maj. John Reynolds to command the battalion. Commandant Colonel Harris did not receive official word from the Navy Department until 15 July. The orders stated, in part: "You will be pleased to detail from the barracks four companies... the whole under the command of Major Reynolds... for temporary field service under Brig. General McDowell... [the Army] will furnish the battalion with camp equipage, provisions, etc." The Marine Battalion would consist of 12 officers and 336 enlisted men. Of that number to be drawn from the Marine Barracks in Washington, only six officers, nine NCOs, and seven privates had been in the Corps before the war, with only a hand full of those having seen action. The Marines were equally ill prepared in equipage. As recruits the Marines had not been issued field equipment, and the Washington Barracks Quartermaster did not have adequate stocks on hand. The Marines were ordered to roll their blankets with a spare pair of socks inside, the ends tied together and wear them over the right shoulder to the left side. A request was telegraphed to Philadelphia for watchcoats, haversacks, and canteens. The canteens and haversacks were expressed to Washington, but no coats were forthcoming.



Orders were received the next day (16 July) to depart for the field. The Marines were assigned to the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Army Division and took their place behind the brigade's horse drawn artillery (Capt. Charles Griffin's Battery D, 2nd US Artillery). The rest of the Army, largely composed of short-service volunteers, was hardly better prepared for a campaign.

Major John Reynolds, assigned as the battalion's commanding officer, was an experienced 60 year old officer, a hard bitten veteran of the Seminole and Mexican Wars. He recognized the painful shortcomings of his force and used every opportunity to run his men through the manual of arms and drill they would need in combat. All during the march on the 16th and throughout the day of the 17th until well after sundown, Reynolds drilled his battalion. The 18th brought another brief march to Centerville VA., where the division camped for the next two days. This halt brought no rest for the Marines as Reynolds relentlessly continued the training.



The Marine Corps at the beginning of the Civil War had no permanently established regiments. In fact there had been only a very few occasions that the Corps, in its history to that point, had even consolidated enough Marines to form battalions for temporary duty ashore. Thus there was rarely occasion to carry colors into the field. The march to Manassas would become one of those occasions.


Unlike the Army the Marines had no organizational flags such as Regimental Colors. The did, however, have a Service Flag based on the National Ensign, a common military practice of the era.

The flag at the left is a reproduction of the flag in the Marine Corps' collection, purportedly carried by the Marine Battalion at Manassas.

General McDowell, the Commander of the Union forces elected to attack on 21 July. The 2nd Division drew the mission of flanking the Confederate left with a march starting at 2:00 a.m. which would take them to a ford across Bull Run Creek, five miles north near Sudley Church. Surprise was lost after delays stretched the movement into daylight, and the ford was not crossed until mid morning. The Rebel forces responded to the threat, but the Union forces, now advancing south along the Sudley-Newmarket Road would counter their movements. Gen. Burnside's 2nd Brigade would make first contact at around 11:00 a.m. The Federal soldiers initially pushed the Rebels back in heavy fighting on Matthews Hill. Capt. Griffin's Battery, now joined by Capt. James Ricketts' Battery D, 1st US Artillery, take a position on Mattews Hill west of the Sudley-Newmarket Road and provide supporting fire for Burnside's attack (Map 1). The 1st Brigade was ordered to take up positions to the rear of the artillery with the Marines on the right.

Over the next two hours, as the Union infantry drove the Confederates back, the two batteries of artillery would make a series of advances along the western side of the road to a ridge just north west of the intersection of the Warrenton Turnpike and the Sudley-Newmarket Road. At each stop the artillery inflicted severe casualties on the enemy flank. The Marines, along with the remainder of the 1st Brigade, followed the guns at the double-quick. As of yet they

Map #1





The Sudley-Newmarket Road and Warrenton Turnpike crossroads as seen from Henry Hill.

had not played any direct role in the battle, but the Marines had lost three men killed from enemy artillery fire. Dropping their blanket roles the Marines prepared to enter the battle in earnest.


Another assault by the Federals of Burside's Brigade pushed the Confederates across the Warrenton Turnpike and onto a crest south east of the intersection locally named Henry Hill for the family who's house stands there.

At just before 2:00 p.m. Maj. Barry, Gen. McDowell's Chief of Artillery, wishing to keep pressure on the retreating enemy, ordered Griffin's and Rickett's Batteries to cross the road and advance to a position near the Henry House. Griffin, deeply concerned about the lack of infantry support assigned for such a move, non-the-less followed orders and advanced his guns to Henry Hill. Lieutenant Averell, the 1st Brigade's assistant adjutant general, hearing Griffin's concerns, ordered the 11th New York Regiment and the Marine Battalion to move forward in support. The Marines and New Yorkers struggled to keep up with the artillery. Moving at the double-quick they crossed the turnpike, forded Youngs Branch, and up the 300 yard slope to the Henry House.

By the time the Marines had arrived at the crest north of the Henry House both batteries had unlimbered and commenced fire. Ricketts had positioned his guns just south of the house firing eastward. Capt. Griffin had detached two of his guns and had them take position to the far right of Rickett's battery, with his remaining guns taking position on the left just north of the Henry House. The raw Marines had kept good order, but were physically drained after running to keep up with the quick moves by the artillery. However, they would soon be ordered to move again. With the Marines and the New Yorkers the first infantry to arrive in support of the artillery, it is



believed that Capt. Griffin then ordered them to move south along the ridge to protect his exposed guns on the right of the line (Map 2).



The 11th New York took position on the far right of the line behind Griffin's two detached guns. The Marines were posted to their left behind Rickett's right flank. The 14th Brooklyn Regiment had also been sent forward to fill the line but had been delayed and were still moving south along the Sudley Road.

Once the Marines were in position behind Rickett's guns a few Marine officers, including 2ndLt. Robert Hitchcock, moved forward to observe the artillery duel with Confederate guns about 400 yards to the east. Hitchcock was heard to remark "the cannon balls are flying pretty thick." The comment would prove to be his last as a Confederate cannon ball ricochet off the ground and decapitated the young lieutenant. As his body fell one of his Marines attempted to catch him. A second ball took off the Marine's arm and severed Hitchcock's lifeless body.


As the Marines were witnessing this carnage of their own a line of troops was spotted coming out of the woods to right front of the union batteries. Capt. Griffin ordered his guns trained on the advancing line believing them to be Confederates. Maj. Barry countermanded the order, however, insisting that they were union infantry coming to support the guns. This proved to be a fatal mistake. The approaching line of infantry, the 33rd Virginia Regiment, formed ranks only 70 yards to the front of the federal guns, leveled their muskets and fired a devastating volley into the cannoneers.



At this same moment Confederate cavalry, the 1st Virginia under J.E.B. Stuart, charged the right flank of the 11th New York. Being pressed both on their flank and now receiving fire from the infantry to their front was more than the New Yorkers could take. Their ranks broke and they retreated back down the hill intermingling with the remains of the decimated cannoneers.


The Marine Battalion returned fire as the officers and NCOs were compelling the weaker spirits back into line. The Virginia infantry pressed the advance and directed volley fire at the Marines. Taking casualties from the heavy Confederate fire to their front and their flank exposed by the retreating Fire Zouaves, the Marine Battalion was forced to withdraw. With other units around them dissolving, the Marines were caught up in the stampede back to

the crossroads (Map 3).



The Marines rallied and reformed near the crossroads and, with the reorganized 14th Brooklyn Regiment and the 79th New York "Highlanders," advanced back up the hill in an attempt to retake the captured union guns. Cresting the hill near the wreckage of Rickett's battery the union forces took the enemy under enfilade fire driving east across the plateau and into the pine woods beyond. The Union line advancing in column of Regiments, with the 14th Brooklyn in the lead followed closely by the Marines and lastly the 79th New York Highlanders, quickly advanced to within 50 yards of the positions held by Gen. Thomas Jackson's Brigade (Map 4).





The Confederates opened with a withering fire and the Marines took the full effect of the volley. Their line wavered but the Marines quickly recovered and pressed forward along with the New York regiments plunging into the

pines. However, as the Confederate fire intensified the Union line finally broke and once again retreated back down the hill, Marines intermingling with the Brooklyn regiment and other remnants of the second assault.

Surgeon Daniel M. Conrad of the 2nd Virginia Infantry surveyed the bloody aftermath and would later remark "The green pines were filled with 79th Highlanders and the red-breeched Brooklyn Zouaves, but the only men that were killed and wounded twenty to thirty yards behind and in the rear of our lines were the United States Marines."


This second repulse was more than some could stand and they continued their flight beyond the crossroads. But Maj. Reynolds, for a second time, was able to stem the retreat of the majority of his men and reorganized his Battalion at the crossroads. They pushed up the Sudley-Newmarket Road and took cover behind the Henry Hill



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side of the embankment. Several other regiments had taken refuge there and were preparing for a third attempt to gain Henry Hill. The Marine Battalion joined the advance, but no sooner than it had begun Confederate reinforcements arrived on the left and opened fire in the Federal flank. This was more than the demoralized Federals could bear. They withdrew to the protection of the roadbed and retreated down the road. Most of the Marines rallied, along with remnants of several regiments, in a field on the south west corner of the crossroads, but the fight was finally drained from them.

By this time the Confederates had launched an all out counter attach driving the remainder of the Union forces in the direction of the crossroads. This time there were no stopping the disorganized Northern troops. The Marines initially attempted to withdrew in good order, forming a rear guard for a short time, but were soon forced to retreat with the rest of the Union army (Map 5).



The disorganized and demoralized Union Army spent a miserable rainy night winding its way back to Washington. Maj. Reynolds arrived at the Long Bridge on the outskirts of the Capital, and found a large body of soldiers, including 70 Marines, being held from crossing over the Potomac by a Provost Guard. Reynolds pride in his Corps and compassion for his men compelled him to persuade the Provost officer to allow his Marines to cross, and he marched them back to Marine Barracks, Washington.



Losses to the Marine battalion totaled 44 dead, wounded, or taken prisoner. The Commandant lamented the embarrassment to the Corps, for "it was the first instance in recorded history where its members were forced to turn their backs to the enemy." Despite this, Col. Andrew Porter commanding the 1st Brigade, 2nd Army Division would praise the Marines for their performance in his after action report, stating that although they were recruits, "through the constant exertions of their officers [they] had been brought to a fine military appearance." Nonetheless, Commandant Harris, determined that his Marines

would not be again thrown into battle unprepared, ask the Secretary of the Navy to obtain the release of the

Marine Battalion from the War Department. Throughout the remainder of the war the Marines would be involved in numerous amphibious operations along the Southern coasts, but they would not again serve on land with the U.S. Army in major operations for the rest of the Civil War.

The M1859 Marine Undress Uniform, Manassas, Virginia, July 1861:

Just prior to the American Civil War the Marine Corps implemented a major uniform design change which would closely follow European style. American Military fashion of the 1860s would be dominated by French Army styles, which was a historic departure from the British patterns that had governed American uniforms from the time of the Revolution. The Marine 1859 designs would embrace these new fashion ideas while still incorporating a number of the Corps' earlier English influences. These new Marine uniforms would have a unique mix of the old and the new combining together to create a hybrid



This Marine officer and enlisted men are typical in appearance to those that marched to Manassas, Virginia in July 1861.

"look" that was characteristically American and has become distinctive to the era. The new uniform regulations would prescribe variations of the dark blue wool coat, and sky blue wool (or white linen in warm weather) trousers for all levels of uniform. This included fatigue, undress, and dress uniforms.

The undress uniform, a new level of dress for the enlisted ranks, would fill the gap for general service and duty. The "dress" uniform would now be reserved for more formal occasions, and fatigue dress would largely be confined to shipboard use.

However, this new Undress uniform, which would now become the principle field/combat uniform for the Marines, still utilized the same bright colors of its dress counterpart. By today's standards, and with today's arms, it would

Private of Marines, M1859 Undress.

seem quite foolish to go into combat in a bright colored uniform, with white belts and polished brass, but many of the intangibles we take for granted today as part of the Corps' ceremonies and traditions were in fact directly related to warfighting in those earlier eras. The concepts of a squared away uniform, polished brass and boots, gleaming bayonets, and "snap and pop" in drill were often essential to the effectiveness and success in combat. The weapons technology at the beginning of the Civil War would continue to dictate how battles were fought and the uniform would continue to play a vital role in the overall tactical strategy as a psychological tool. Having to stand in battle in very close proximity with their adversaries the uniform was intended to impress, even intimidate the enemy. An ornate well kept uniform projected a sense of discipline, espirit-de-corps, and professionalism.

The undress uniform consisted of a dark blue wool fatigue cap, or "kepi," of French pattern with a brass hunting horn infantry badge on front. The badge contained a red leather backed silver 'M' in its center. The officer's version of this fatigue cap was trimmed in black mohair cording, and would be the first Marine officers cap to officially bear a quatrefoil on it's top. These caps had adjustable leather chin straps attached with two small Marine buttons. Regulation prescribed that the straps were to be warn down when on duty, and up when off.

Lieutenant of Marines, M1859 Undress

The enlisted undress coat was a single breasted frock design of dark indigo blue kersey wool. It had a standup collar "rising no higher then to permit the chin to turn freely over it," and welted in red at its base, where the collar joins the coat. This collar height would quickly reduce as the war progressed. There were seven large M1840 Marine buttons down the front, and two small Marine buttons on each cuff. The skirt was full cut, extending at a **minimum** from the top



of the hip to the crotch of the trousers, however, photos of the period show that the skirts were often longer. Since the shirt hem of the enlisted coat was issued "raw edged," the coats were initially issued with the shirt length roughly between the crotch and knee allowing room for the shirt to be repeatedly trimmed as the bottom of the coat frayed. The coat had two large buttons in

Orderly (First) Sergeant of Marines. He wears the M1859 enlisted undress uniform, as he would have appeared in the summer of 1861. His rank is indicated by a red worsted wool red backed yellow chevrons, with a separate one inch lozenge underneath, on each sleeve. He is armed with the new M1859 sword authorized for sergeants, carried in a frog on the waist belt.

back along the seem where the shirt joins, marking where the waist belt should ride. The officers variation of the undress coat was double breasted, without trim. Officers rank was indicated by newly adopted "Russian Knots" worn on each shoulder. In 1859 the Marine Corps adopted chevrons, similar to those used by the Army, to be worn on the upper sleeve to sash around the waist, and three indicate Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) ranks. These "stripes" were worn points up and made of half inch yellow silk taping with a red background. Two chevrons indicated a Corporal, and three a sergeant. Staff NCO positions were appointed and would include a red worsted sash around the waist, and additions to the chevrons (such as a "lozenge" indicating an Orderly or First Sergeant).

Although the 1859 uniform regulations specify a shirt of dark blue wool flannel for normal wear, during hot weather an un-died muslin shirt was prescribed to be worn under the coat. A leather stock was prescribed for garrison, however it was often dispensed with in the field or at sea. Both items were similar to the Army issued pattern.

The normal service trousers were of sky blue wool. Line Officers and Senior Staff NCOs (i.e. Sergeant Major and Quartermaster Sergeant) were authorized a narrow red welt down each leg, with all others being plain. During warm weather plain white linen trousers were authorized for all ranks. This was the case for those Marines sent to Manassas.

The shoes were a standard smooth black leather military Jefferson Boot often referred to as 'brogans.' The belts continued to be of white buff leather. Although the 1859 regulations called for new "French pattern" equipment specifying that both the cartridge box and bayonet to be worn on the waist belt, evidence shows that the white cross belts continued in use through most of the Civil War. The exception to this was the Sergeants, who would now carry their accouterments on the belt. The officers wore a white glazed leather sword belt bearing an eagle and wreath buckle. They were also authorized to wear a black leather version, similar to their Army counterparts, with the undress uniform. It is believed that both variants were used by the Marine officers that went to Manassas Junction.

On paper both the Regular Army and the Marine Corps had accepted the M1855 rifled musket for use in the late 1850's. However, these weapons didn't go into production until 1857 and the Springfield and Harpers Ferry Arsenals would turn out only a relatively small number in the years leading up to the war. Thus, at the beginning of the Civil War the majority of Marines (especially recruits in training) were still being issued the M1842 smooth bore musket.



M1842 .69 cal. smoothbore musket with socket bayonet and M1828 scabbard.

Because these smoothbore muskets were slow to load and very ineffective individually in both range and accuracy, tactics of the era would dictate massing these weapons together with Marines standing shoulder-to-shoulder allowing for a combined volume of fire. These linear tactics, often referred to as "Napoleonic Tactics," would essentially have a human wall face a human wall. The "Marine Drill" and manual of arms being used by the Corps at the beginning of the War had its origins going back over two decades. Derived from "Scots Infantry Tactics" but modified for Marine

Corps use and driven by the slow advancement in weapons technology, the basic movements trace back to the American Revolution and the works of VonSteuben.



adopted in 1859. The sergeants sword would evolve had only the barest of essentials available to into today's NCO sword.

In 1859 the Army pattern "Foot Officer's sword" was adopted by the Corps for both Officers and Sergeants, replacing both the officer's "Mamaluke" hilted sword, and the eagles head sergeants sword. Marine officers would return to the Mamaluke sword in 1868, but the sergeants sword would evolve into our current NCO sword.

Although the Marines were normally issued packs and other equipment for service Marine officer's (top) and Sergeant's swords ashore, the recruit battalion sent to Manassas them. No pack or tentage was issued. The now famous shelter half did not come into

the American military system until 1862, and there was no other military tentage available to send with the Marines on such short notice. Their only protection from the elements was their gray wool blanket and possibly a rubberized cloth "gum blanket" and/or overcoat. Although requisitioned, there is no evidence to show that these latter two items arrived in time to be issued to the recruits prior to their march to Manassas. Lacking a pack, the Marines were directed to form their blanket into a long roll, with the ends tied together, with a spare pair of socks inside. They were to be carried over the right shoulder during the march.

Even canteens and haversacks had to be emergency requisitioned. The canteen the Marines were issued was the same as that being used by the US Army. Round smooth-sided tin with a cork stopper, the quart canteen was commonly covered in a gray wool (although bark blue,

sky blue, and brown were also common). The three-quarter inch wide strap was of natural oiled



utilized to carry rations and mess with cloth for economy reasons. gear. However, Marines (and for any immediate need non-issue personal items such as a pipe and tobacco and even playing cards (even though gambling was strictly forbidden).

leather with an iron "roller buckle" for Left: The haversack and canteen. adjustment. As the war progressed the The haversack was normally canteen straps would quickly be replaced

The haversack, used for carrying soldiers) would also use the bag rations, was also the same as Army issue. Made of "tarred" canvas (including the sling), the bag was approximately 12 x 12 inches with a single leather strap and buckle closure. Minimal rations consisted of hardtack, salted beef or pork, and some

condiments such as coffee, salt and possibly sugar. A four inch diameter tinned cup completed the mess gear.

Thus equipped the Marines would endure the long and arduous march to Manassas, and the horrors and carnage of the combat that followed.

The New Marine Corps Detachment / Company Organizational Structure of 1860, and its impact on the Marine Battalion at Manassas:

In 1860 the Marines would standardize their individual detachment structure modeling it off of the Army's Infantry Company. Because of its primary mission of providing detachments for US Naval vessels and guard detachments for Navy Yards The Marine Corps organization consisted primarily of independent Detachments (Companies). Only in time of national emergency would the Corps form temporary battalions for duty ashore. During land operations the Marines would follow the Army's infantry linear tactical doctrine.

The 'new' Marine "Company" would consist of three officers (one Captain, one First Lieutenant, and one Second Lieutenant), nine NCOs (five Sergeants and four Corporals), two musicians (one Drummer and one Fifer), and 70 to 80 Privates divided into two Platoons of two Sections (Squads) each.

Optimally a Marine Company would consist of three officers (one Captain and two lieutenants), five sergeants, four corporals, two musicians (drummer and fifer), and 70-80 privates organized as follows:

Company Command Group:


1 - Captain, Company Commander, 🥢



1 - First /Orderly Sergeant, 2 - Musicians (Drummer and Fifer)

Platoon structure (two platoons per company):

1 - Lieutenant (Platoon Leader),





2 - Corporals (one per section), 35 to 40 Privates

Section structure (two sections per platoon):



1 - Sergeant, 1 - Corporal

1 - Corporal, 18 to 20 Privates

Although this was the ideal structure on paper the manpower shortages, especially among experienced officers and NCOs, would cause many shortfalls in the organization of the Marine Battalion that would be ordered to go to Manassas in July 1861. Further these Companies were independent detachments assigned to either Navy Yards of Naval Ships at sea, and virtually never trained together. The Corps had no experience since the Mexican War in organizing even a battalion strength for operations ashore.

During a special session called on 4 July 1861 Congress authorized an increase of the Marine Corps to 3,860 officers and enlisted men, doubling it's existing strength. Although this brought a substantial number of new recruits to the Corps virtually all of the veteran officers and NCOs needed to train them had already been detailed to ship's detachments. Thus in early July 1861 a battalion strength of new recruits had been formed at Marine Barracks, Washington, now acting as a temporary training depot. However there were only four experienced officers, and an equal number of seasoned NCOs to train them.

Nonetheless, when President Lincoln called for a force to meet the Confederates at Manassas the Secretary of the Navy, acting on orders from the War Department, ordered the Marines at the Washington Barracks to mobilize and prepare to march with the Army to Manassas. In a blatant departure from well-established protocol, Secretary of the Navy Wells sent orders to several Marine officers to report to Washington for duty without going through the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He further assigned Major John Reynolds to command the battalion. Commandant Harris did not receive official notice of this assignment from the Navy Department until 15 July.

These Marine recruits would be organized into a 4 company battalion with a small staff as follows:

Commanding Officer: Major John G. Reynolds, USMC

Btn. Staff: Adjutant: Major Augustus Nicholson,

3 Musicians, and 1 Apprentice Music Boy

Company A: Officers: (Brevet) Major Jacob Zeilen, Commanding

Second Lieutenant Frank Munroe Second Lieutenant John Grimes

Enlisted: 2 Non-commissioned officers, and 80 privates (approx.)

Company B: Officers: Captain James Jones, Commanding

Second Lieutenant Robert Huntington

Enlisted: 3 Non-commissioned officers, and 80 privates (approx.)

Company C: Officers: First Lieutenant Alan Ramsay, Commanding

Second Lieutenant Robert Hitchcock

Enlisted: 3 Non-commissioned officers, and 80 privates (approx.)

MCHC H.B. No.: 144

Company D: Officers: Second Lieutenant William Carter, Commanding

Second Lieutenant William Hale

Enlisted: 3 Non-commissioned officers, and 80 privates (approx.)

Aggregate Strength: 12 Officers

12 Non-commissioned officers 3 Musicians, and 1 apprentice

324 Privates (approx.)

Total Battalion Strength: Approximately 352 United States Marines

As Marine Major John Reynolds marched his battalion over the Potomac Long Bridge on the afternoon of July 16, 1861, he must have wondered what lay ahead for his Marines. As a Mexican War veteran, Reynolds had seen Marines serve with distinction in that war 14 years earlier. He now fully expected his command to do the same. Even so, as an officer with 35 years of military service under his belt, Reynolds worried about the green recruits under his command. True, they were Marines, but most had less that three weeks in the Corps with no experience and minimal training at that point. Despite the relentless training that Reynolds would put them through during the five day march Manassas, as they headed toward their first fight, in a new war, across a small Virginia creek called Bull Run, Reynolds knew that his doubts would only be answered when the bullets began to fly.

By the evening of 21 July 1861, despite the disastrous loss by the Federal forces, Major Reynolds could say that his Marines had served with distinction.





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